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Biodiversity conservation and carbon mitigation: two problems, one







Esse artigo tem três objetivos complementares. Primeiro, enfatizar a
relação entre a conservação da diversidade biológica e a redução
dos gases causadores do “efeito estufa” por países em
desenvolvimento. Segundo, mostrar utilizando a teoria da incerteza
que a conservação da diversidade biológica não é economicamente
ótima. Finalmente, através de um Modelo de Gerações Superpostas
(OLG) que a conservação das espécies naturais com o objetivo de
mitigar os efeitos das emissões de gases causadores do
aquecimento global é ótima tertemporalmente. Como é amplamente
sabido, o Protocolo de  Kyoto não é, até o presente momento,
eficiente para reduzir a emissão dos gases causadores do
aquecimento global. O principal problema é que não há incentivos
econômicos para que os países responsáveis pela maior parte das
emissões cumpram as determinações do acordo.
Palavras-chave: diversidade biológica, aquecimento global, modelo
de gerações superpostas.
Área de Classificação da ANPEC: Área 05 (Economia Regional e
Economia Agrícola).
• Abstract
This paper has three complementary objectives. First, to emphasise
the relationship between conservation of biological diversity and
carbon mitigation in developing countries. Second, to show, using the
uncertainty theory that the conservation of biological diversity is not
economic viable. Finally, through an Overlapping Generations Model
(OLG) to demonstrate that to conserve biological diversity with the
objective of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases is optimal
overtime. As is well known, the Kyoto Protocol is not, for the time
being, efficient to reduce CO2. The main problem lies upon the lack of
economic incentives to motive main polluter countries to obey the
Protocol rules.
Key words:  biological diversity, global warming and overlapping
generation model.
JEL Classification: Q2
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Biodiversity conservation and carbon mitigation: two problems, one
solution? Searching for answers using uncertainty and game theories.
• Initial Considerations
There is a growing concern with the consequences of provoked climatic
changes. Emissions of gases are originated from several human activities,
many of them essential to the process of economic growth. Improvements of
people well being also demands a larger use of environmental goods and
services that could affect current and future generations. Transport of loads and
people, increase of agriculture production, urbanisation, and industrialisation
determine the level of standard of living of people and also the amount of
emitted per capita greenhouse gases.
The discussion about the destruction of biological diversity has also been
intense on ecological and economic grounds. Among the ecological reasons
there are: the need to maintain the processes of natural evolution; to aid in the
regulation of the physical-chemical balances of the biosphere; absorption and
decomposition of pollutant organic, among others. The more important
economic reasons are: the supply of nutritious products, raw material for the
industry; development of the agricultural production; exploration of the
biotechnology with the domain of the genetic manipulations; exploration of eco-
tourism (LÉVEQUÊ, 1999).
Global warming and conservation of biological diversity are both subject of
international conventions. The ultimate objective of the Climate Change
Convention (CCC) is to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the  atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system
1. The Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) deals with international rights to have access, to use and to conserve the
available genetic resources in the world. In spite of emphasising "the
conservation and the sustainable use of the biological diversity for the present
and future generations (ASSAD and PEREIRA, 1998, p.29), the CBD does not
entering thoroughly in the related economic aspects (HURLBUT, 1994, p.2).
Some scholars, however, are sceptical in relation to the viability of
implementation and to the effectiveness of both conventions. DORE,
GUEVARA and NOGUEIRA (1999) pointed out some crucial questions about
CCC
2, in particular lack of financial commitment and of enforcement
                                                                
1Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame  sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to ensure that  food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to
proceed  in a sustainable manner (Article 2).
2Dore, Guevara and Nogueira (1999) listed the following problematic aspects related to the CCC and to
the Kyoto Protocol (KP): a) they will have to rely on the existing Global Environmental Facility; there is NO
additional money committed to reach the objectives of the Convention; to date the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) is just an empty gesture, without any commitment for any Annex 2 nation; b) the
Secretariat has NO funds to adjustment for developing countries; no developing country will have any
incentive to sign on to KP; c) there are no penalties for no-compliance with KP; there is no reason to
suppose that the KP targets will be met by the Annex 1 countries, and the responsibilities of Annex 2
countries are not spelled out in KP; there is no enforcement mechanism and from the legal point of view
KP is indistinguishable from the CCC, just as the targets of the Convention were no met and there were no
penalties, KP targets are in essence voluntary and therefore indistinguishable from those of the CCC; d)3
mechanisms to reach its objectives. Similar criticisms may be made to the CBD.
Result of a long debate rotated around conflicting positions between developed
(PD) and developing (PED) countries, the CDB emphasises the need of
inventory by signatory countries of their biological resources, in order to protect
their threatened species. That would allow them to exchange information and
genetic resources with the purpose of sharing research information, profits and
technological know how. Thus, PED (biodiversity deposits) would give up their
biological resources in exchange for technology, provided mainly by PD.
Nevertheless, both conventions will play a crucial role on future discussion
between PED and PD on environmental matters. Brazil, in particular, has the
largest area under tropical forest in the whole world, with significant biological
diversity. However, Brazil has also the highest global annual rate of
deforestation. We agree with FEARNSIDE (1999) that any measure able to
reduce the rate of deforestation will represent a huge contribution to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and to conserve biological diversity. This paper
contributes in identifying basic characteristics of a measure like that, using
uncertainty and game theories. In the next section, we present a uncertainty
model to analyse issues affecting biodiversity conservation. It is followed by an
game theoretic OLG model dealing with key aspects of cooperation toward
global warming mitigation. Finally, consequences of our results for policy design
are discussed in the final section.
• Safe Minimum Standard and the CBD: a new game proposed.
Biodiversity is, definitively, of economic interest. The importance of biological
diversity may be analysed at a microeconomic level, in which those resources
are used as raw materials for economic activities, especially in medicine related
industries [see SIMPSON, SEDJO & REID (1996); RAUSSER & SMALL (2000);
BARRETT & LYBERT (2000)], or as a final product (eco-tourism). There are
also models based upon the theory of finance, that would seek to explore the
value of option to biodiversity (POLASKY, SOLOW & BROADUS, 1993).
Another form of considering the economic importance of biodiversity is at the
macroeconomic level. There are models discussing the importance of the
biodiversity to the international trade (CABO, 1999) or the interactions and
conflicts between conservation and development (NORGAARD, 1987;
NEUMAYER, 1998). There are also models studying the theme of international
co-operation as a requisite for conservation, using game theory.
As a matter of fact, game theory has been widely used in studies dealing with
conservation of biological diversity. In one of these studies, LÉVEQUÊ (1999)
argues that the principle of equality among generations is an ethical reason to
conserve biodiversity. That principle determines that the next generation is
entitled to receive the planet in the same way that the current generation
received it, in terms of natural resources. TISDELL (1999) agrees, considering
                                                                                                                                                                                             
KP does not match the equity provisions of other in international agreements, like the Montreal Protocol for
CFCs; e) it does nothing to implement the equity provisions of the CCC either; f) from the point of view of
equitable implementation of a global climate policy that is designed to slow down global warming, the only
conceptual innovation in KP is the CDM; but money has yet to be provided for it; and g) KP is therefore
nothing more than a gesture of good will.4
the principle of equality as a sustainability criterion, being fundamental in
maintaining the economy.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) points out that we should
conserve the biological diversity to protect humanity of eventual natural
disasters. These disasters can be avoided and/or their impacts minimised with
the existence of biological diversity. There are still the ethical and existential
reasons. CBD arguments resemble the theory of Safe Minimum Standard
(SMS), formulated by CIRIACY-WANTRUP (1968). His basic argument is to
guarantee the conservation while the costs are socially acceptable, not
mattering potential value or revenue derived from the projects. SMS doesn't
specify limits to social costs of conservation. In this context, the use of
biodiversity resources should be limited to essential activities. Development
projects should be discarded, unless it is considered to be vital for society well
being.
The basic argument for following a SMS strategy is that potentials social costs
due to the destruction of biodiversity stocks can be much larger than any benefit
from development projects. Biodiversity destruction may be irreversible, while
development projects can be reallocated or modified without larger damages.
This argument is controversial. If it is true that several lethal diseases affect
humanity, it is also true one does not know if cure for this disease could be
found in a given organism. However, it may be found in a particular plant and
what would be the social cost if this plant were extinguished? It is, therefore,
extremely difficult to verify empirically the validity of SMS formulation.
Nevertheless, many economists have accepted the challenge of  Ciriacy-
Wantrup’s ideas and have tried to validate the SMS. A landmark in this direction
is the study by BISHOP (1978), who uses a game theory model
3. His model
describes a static game between society and nature, called “insurance game”,
in which the rule of decision is to maximize the usefulness for society, given the
actions of nature. The former is confronted with a choice between to conserve a
certain area or to implement a development project that will destroy local
biodiversity. Nature then determines if there is or not the outbreak of a disease,
which cure can be found with certainty in a specie existing in the area.
Bishop’s results corroborated the insights by  Ciriacy-Wantrup. In 1991,
however, READY and BISHOP (1991) re-analysed the theme, formulating two
types of games. Their results suggested two opposite and conflicting strategies
of conservation: one recommending a maximum and the other a minimum of
conservation. Since then SMS lost some of its theoretical appeal. Results by
Ready and Bishop were confronted by PALMINI (1999). He argues that the two
games built by READY & BISHOP (1991) were, actually, sub-games belonging
to a more complex structure. Solving a dynamic game
4,  Palmini found
                                                                
3It is our opinion that there is a misunderstanding in this formulation. As it is a situation of decision
considering actions of nature, that is not a rational opponent, it is not a case for a game, but of a choice
situation under risk or uncertainty.
4The problem with this model, that also appears in BISHOP (1978) and READY & BISHOP (1991), is the
situation defined, the interaction society-nature, as a game. We agree with MYERSON (1991) in defining a5
evidences that would justify SMS. In other words, he pointed out that the best
strategy in the presence of uncertainty is to guarantee the maximum
conservation level.
In models built to justify the SMS, players are “society” and “nature”. Actions of
society are defined into preserving or not the biological diversity, given that the
state of  nature in the future is not known. Actions by “nature”, therefore, don't
obey a rational and intelligent behaviour. They are, of course, random. The
maximum one can do is to analyse probabilities based upon information of
previous situations and to do forecasts of the future. Then it can be concluded
that the model developed by PALMINI (1999) is not a game but actually a
model of choice involving risk.
Palmini’s model describes a situation where there is a rational agent making
choices under risk and/or uncertainty. In a situation like this, the game theory
approach is not the most appropriate. The best way to formalise this situation is
to apply the expected utility property
5. Under a situation of risk and uncertainty
society has to choose between “development” and “conservation”. This choice
can be illustrated in Figure I:
Figure I
The Interaction Between Society and Nature
                      Source: Palmini (1999) with adaptation by authors.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
game as: " A conflict situation and cooperation among [two or more] rational and intelligent players”
(MYERSON, 1991, pp. 1).
5It is assumed that utility functions respect the three postulates necessary to apply the expected utility
property: completeness, continuity and monotocity. For a detailed description of these properties see
HARSANYI, 1986)
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Where:
D represents the choice of development;
P represents the choice of conservation;
dc e ndc are actions of nature, represented by the outbreak or not of a new
disease, respectively;
R&D e NR&D are choices by society between search or not for the cure of the
new disease through research and development;
C e NC represent actions of nature, in the sense that the cure will or will not be
possible through the efforts of society;
p e s represents probabilities of happening each state of nature in each one of
these situations;
a, b, c, d, g e h represents the payoffs.
The options to society, in a risky situation, are:
D = {a, p; b, (1 – p)}
6                                                                                       (1)
P = {c, p; X, (1 – p)}                                                                                         (2)
where X = {g, s; h, (1 – s)}                                                                               (3)
therefore P = {c, p; g, (1 – p)s; h, (1 – p)(1 – s)}                                             (2’)
Assuming uncertainty, options to society are given by:
D’ = {a|e; b|e  }
7                                                                                                   (4)
P’ = {c|e; X’|e  }                                                                                                    (5)
X’= {g|f; h|f  }                                                                                                       (6)
￿  P’ = {c|ef; g|ef; c|e f ; h|e f } = {c|e; g|ef; h|e f  }                                          (5’)
In this model p is the probability that a new disease will appear and that the
biodiversity is necessary somehow to combat it. It is reasonable to suppose that
this probability is not know; that is, society can only form opinion about the
case. The probability of finding cure for this disease obeys the same logic,
because we do not know which organism has the possibility of cure and we do
                                                                
6It can be read: in choosing development, society receives a with probability p and b with probability (1 –
p).
7It can be read: in choosing development, society receives a if event e occurs and b if event  eoccurs.7
not know whether the scientific research will be effective in finding the cure.
This is, therefore, a problem of maximising expected utility under uncertainty.
Applying the property of expected utility to equations (4) and (5`), we have:
U(D’) = U(a|e; b|e) = p
eU(a) = (1 – p
e)U(b)                                                       (8)
U(P’) = U(c|e; g|ef; h|e f  ) = p
eU(c) + (1 – p
e)s
eU(g) + (1 – p
e)(1 – s
e)U(h)
                                                                                                                                                           (9)
Where p
e e s
e are, respectively, subjective probabilities attribute by society to
events “no out break of disease” (ndc) e “development of cure” (C). To conserve
will be the best strategy if:
U(P’) ‡ U(D’)                                                                                                                           (10)
PALMINI (1999) defines values relevant to the problem as:
§  B
d: benefit to society due to the development project;
§  B
p
c: immediate benefit of conservation to society (may represent the
existence value of conservation);
§  B
p
f: potential future benefit, after the outbreak of a disease and in the
case that cure is found;
§  L: costs of research, development and application of the new drug;
§  R: Costs of research and development, in the case the cure is not found
(that is, sunk costs).




c, to justify society doubts between to conserve and to develop;
2.  B
p
f >> L, disease, if it becomes a reality, will bring high negative
consequences to society;
3.  L > R, a consequence of R representing a frustrated option.
In this context, the payoffs of Figure I are:
§  a = B
d




§  c = B
p
c






§  g = B
p
c – L





Taking these values as utilities for society in each situation
9 and applying
equations (8) and (9):
                                                                
8The payoff d, that corresponds to a, preservation ﬁ disease ﬁ research does not take place, is strictly
worse than payoff g and can, therefore, be eliminated.
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Re-writing:































1 1                                                    (14)
Note that the value of this inequality depends basically upon the probabilities of
the disease outbreak, (1 – p
e), and of finding the cure, (s
e). In the “best
situation”
10 (p
e = 0 e s






d, that is, social benefits of conservation must be higher than social costs of
conservation. This is exactly the decision rule proposed by  CIRIACY-WANTRUP
(1968), the SMS. Any case social benefits must be  higher than social costs
represented by the opportunity costs of giving up development, due to
uncertainty. In the limit (p
e ﬁ 1 e s
e ﬁ 0)
11 future benefits of conservation must
achieve a very high value to justify the conservation strategy. Table I below
shows some results.
Table I: Results of the utility maximisation rule
12
Probabilities Necessary condition for conservation
p
e = 0 e s
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             Source: Estimate by the authors.
The Safe Minimum Standard of CIRIACY WANTRUP (1968) continues without
a concrete theoretical justification. Society, even believing that biodiversity may
                                                                
10In the sense that, intuitively, the preservation should be the best alternative.
11When p
e = 1 e s
e = 0 the result is not determined.
12In a previous version of this paper we also applied a rule of minimising regret, as proposed by  Palmini
(1999). Using the rule proposed by Loomes & Sugden (1982) to utility with regret, we obtained “worse”
results than those obtained trough the utility maximization rule, in the sense that the application of SMS is
never optimal.
13In a approximation with ten decimal points.9
be necessary in the future, would rather receiving actual benefits from
development in the present than potential benefits of biological diversity. This
behaviour is justified due to existence of additional costs to use the biological
diversity resources. In this context, one may argument that the CBD is not
rational from an economic point of view. However, as it was signed there is no
sense in discussing to preserve or not. Signatory countries, as Brazil, must look
for cooperation and adjust their social needs to achieve conservation.
A comparative static analysis of this model reveals na interesting conclusion. An
usual hypothesis is that present benefits of conservation are always smaller
than development benefits. From our results we may argue that as benefits
from conservation increase it become easier to make conservation
economically attractive. In order to increase these  net benefits of conservation
one has either to reduce costs or to increase benefits of conservation projects.
A possible strategy to increase benefits is to consider the value of the Amazon
rainforest ( the world’s biggest biodiversity site) as an alternative to mitigate
effects of CO2 emissions. In other words, to include the Amazon forest in the
Kyoto protocol objectives may transform the CBD in an economic viable
institution.
Nevertheless, still remains the intergeneration problem. That is, conflicting
decisions among different generations of individuals may make conserbationa a
not viable option.  To deal theoretically with this problem one can consider a
model where the agents live infinitely and inter-temporal aspects are lost, or to
insert several generations of people, analysing the interactions among them. In
that type of analysis the most used tool is the overlapping generation model
(OLG). Many analyses have already been made using OLG on environmental
issues. As far as conservation of biodiversity is concerned, VOM AMSBERG
(1995) considered the existence of incomplete markets as responsible for a
politics of inefficient conservation
14. The inefficiency derives from the fact that
the risk faced by the current generation what determines the amount of
available biodiversity for the future generation. The conservation decision of
today is made under uncertainty and the decision of tomorrow is just an
adaptation to the conditions imposed by the current generation. In that context,
it can have a larger risk for the next generation, that will not be able to avoid it
15.
Through the resolution of his model, VOM AMSBERG (1995) concludes that in
the presence of that market failure, the current generation will invest less in
conservation than social necessary, because the risk she confronts is smaller
than the risk that will be confronted by the future generation, Similarly, if the risk
today is larger than the risk of the next generation, there will be over-investment
in conservation. It is relevant to emphasise that VOM AMSBERG'S model just
considers the option value of biodiversity, as proposed by ARROW & FISHER
(1974). There is no possibility of altruism, nor of existence value. Another
                                                                
14The author defines an incomplete market in an inter-temporal context as a market where there are two
generations.  The future generation cannot accomplish contracts. The current generation interacts with the
one that has not been born and, rationally, it doesn't worry about the future generation.
15In the sense that the bad state of  nature today, as in the case of  emergence of some incurable disease,
it will become worse tomorrow.10
important factor is that it would be necessary to have a measure of the
extinction risk, what is not easy.
• OLG Model and Global Warming
A discussion of the critical determinants likely to influence overall costs and
benefits of mitigating greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions have been present in
many existing empirical studies. In the  cost side, three aspects received
attention: (i) different concepts of mitigating costs that have been used in the
models; (ii) selection of base-lines and policy strategies and (iii) differences
among models. In the benefit side, marginal climate change damage avoided is
equal to the marginal climate change benefits of emission control. However, the
benefits of abatement will not be limited to reduce climate change costs alone.
Our model describes relationships among overlapping generations (OLG) in the
decision to conserve a certain natural area, believed to be capable to mitigate
global warming effects. The central idea is to extend the model formulated by
VON AMSBERG (1995), with the purpose of capturing the resulting effect of the
non execution of a contract by the future generation. In this context, instead of
only two periods, as in Von Amsberg’s paper, a third period is considered
aiming to observe the result of a possible retaliation by the initial generation.
Therefore there is three generations j (j = 1, 2, 3). The generation j = 1 lives in
periods t = 1 and t = 2. Generation j = 2 lives in periods t = 2 and t = 3. Finally,
the generation j = 3 lives just in the period t = 3. Consumption of each
generation (from which utility will be derived) is distributed in each period that
this generation is alive. In this situation, each generation will receive an initial
endowment and in the case of generations 1 and 2, this endowment should be
distributed among both periods they will be alive. Therefore, for the first two
generations, their utilities will be determined by consumption in the first period
and by a part of the consumption during the second period. However, all the
endowment will be consumed by the end of both periods.
Generation 1 receives an initial endowment E1. From this endowment she will
have to remove consumption of periods t = 1 and t = 2. A discount factor for
inter-temporal consumption will not be considered. The Generation 1 will still
have to decide if conserves a certain area L, that will be deduced from its
endowment. The conservation of this area is justified by the role in reducing
global warming impacts, in the case global warming really happens. The
Generation 1 hopes to obtain from Generation 2 a payment for the conservation
of area L in t = 2. This payment refers to the cost of conservation incurred by
Generation 1.
In other words, Generation 1reduced consumption the first period and it waits to
be reimbursed in the following period. After all, Generation 2 will be the largest
beneficiary with the conservation, if global warming happens. In case j = 2
decide not to pay, Generation 1 can adopt a retaliatory strategy, consuming a
part of the area L (it will consume ½L) in t = 2. In so doing, the next generations
will receive only a part of the benefits derived from conservation. It should be11
observed that Generation 1 will incur in a loss derived from not consuming L in
period 1 and doing it in period 2.
Notice that if global warming is observed in t = 2, the Generation 1 will also
suffer its effects in case it has not conserved the area L. Losses due to the
effects of global warming is given by G. However, effects upon Generation 1
only affects its utility in one consumption period, while for Generation 2 will
suffer effects in both periods it is alive. The same happens with Generation 3
that only lives and consumes in period t = 3.
It is obvious that Generation 2 will have to make two decisions. First, it should
decide if it pays or not Generation 1 for the conservation. When making this
decision, j = 2 already observed the state of  nature in the period t = 2, but not in
t = 3. Consequently, we have two states of nature. The state A, good state,
where global warming does not with probability p, and the state B, bad state, in
which the global warming takes place, with probability 1 - p. It is assumed at this
point that if state B is observed in t = 2, unfortunately it will also be observed in t
= 3. (if we had more periods, the occurrence of the global warming in any period
would be automatic so that B always happened in the following periods)
16.
The second decision of Generation 2 concerns the conservation or not of the
protected area. An important point derived from the discussion above is that if
the state B be maintained in t = 2, then the option of the generation 2 will
always be in favour of conservation, even if it is only the portion not consumed
by Generation 1 in retaliation to the non payment by Generation 2. As a matter
of fact, the state B in period t will induce the choice of conservation by following
generations. It is easy to explain why. If we do not have more uncertainty in
relation to the occurrence of global warming, conservation insuring the
neutralisation of its effects will always be better to conserve after the start given
by B.
But what is in fact important is to analyse if it the correct decision to conserve
when there is the uncertainty in relation to the state of  nature in the following
period. Then, we need to know how certain we are about the utility of each
generation. As we have seen previously, Generation 1 derived utility from
consumption in periods 1 and 2. If Generation 1 chooses not preserving, its total
consumption in both periods is E1. If  state B occurs it will represent a loss
represented by G. If Generation 1 chooses to preserve, its consumption in both
periods will be E1 - L, where L is the conserved area. With conservation, global
warming impacts will be neutralised in the second period.
The utility of Generation 1 will still depend upon the choice of Generation 2 in
paying or not for the conservation of area L. In the case of no payment,
Generation 1 will still be able to consume the equivalent to ½L in period t = 2
(necessary hypothesis otherwise it would consume everything and would not
have any loss; the partial payment softens the loss but it doesn't eliminate it). If
                                                                
16On the other hand, the occurrence in t =2 does not mean that it will also necessarily occur in t = 3. In this
period, the occurrence probabilities of states A and B are represented by s and 1 - s, respectively. Observe
that these probabilities can be interpreted as the concept of subjective probability.12
the decision is to not conserve, it represents na option for development that will
also be enjoyed by next generations, supplying an additional utility of D for all
three generations. It is supposed that G = D; in other words, the occurrence of
global warming eliminates the gains of utility obtained with the choice of
development.
The utility for Generation 2 will be derived from its consumption in periods 2 and
3. This generation also receives an initial endowment E2. This endowment
besides being divided among periods in which the generation lives, it should
pay to the Generation 1 for the conservation of area L, if it decides to do so.
Thus, if Generation 2 decides to make the payment, its total consumption in
periods 1 and 2 will be E2 - L, respectively. If it decides not to pay, it will
consume E2. However, this consumption will be affected by the occurrence of
global warming effects. Therefore, the utility of Generation 2 will be reduced
during periods the state B is observed. In other words, if the global warming
happens in periods 2 and 3, the utility of Generation 2 will be reduced in both
periods by the factor G.
We  suppose here that G = 2L. That is, the lost utility due to the occurrence of
global warming will be twice what it wins with the destruction, or the
consumption, of area L. Observe that if Generation 2 does not pay for the
conservation of L, Generation 1 will consume ½L in the period 2. Therefore,
Generation 2 will have to decide if it conserves or not the area ½L for the
following period. It is also important to notice that this area will offer a protection
proportional to its size against global warming. Therefore, global warming is
observed, its effect will be ½G.
Finally, the utility of Generation 3 will only be given by its consumption in the
period t = 3. Generation 3 can be affected by the state B if this happens without
protection or with just partial protection. However, this generation does not have
any decision power, nor capacity of retaliation. It is important to observe that the
Generation 2 cannot demand a payment from Generation 3 because it is not
possible to apply a retaliation strategy because the game finishes in the period
3. Consequently, if Generation 2 pay for the conservation, it has already paid
the costs of  conservation. These cannot be postponed ad infinitum.
A hypothesis to be added before the resolution of the game is that if together
Generations 1 and 2 are indifferent between conserving or not, they conserve.
In the same way, if the Generation 2 is indifferent between paying or not, she
pays.
We will analyse utility for each generation of  each situation.
1.1) Generation 1 doesn't conserve
2.1) With global warming in t = 2 (what means global warming in t = 3)
U1 = E1 - G + D
(k) U2 = E2 - 2G + D
U3 = E3 - G + D13
2.2) Without global warming in t = 2, but with global warming in t = 3
U1 = E1 + D
(b) U2 = E2 - G + D
U3 = E3 - G + D
2.3) Without global warming in t = 2 and t = 3
U1 = E1 + D
(a) U2 = E2 + D
U3 = E3 + D
1.2) Generation 1 conserves
2.1) With global warming in t = 2 (and therefore in t = 3)
3.1) Generation 2 pays for the conservation
4.1) Generation 2 also conserves
U1 = E1 - L + L = E1
(l) U2 = E2 - L
U3 = E3
3.2) Generation 2 doesn't pay for the conservation
4.1) Generation 2 conserves what remained
U1 = E1 - L + ½L = E1 - ½L
(m) U2 = E2 - ½G
U3 = E3 - ½G
2.2) Without global warming in t = 2, but with Global Warming in t = 3
3.1) Generation 2 pays for the conservation
4.1) Generation 2 also conserves
U1 = E1 - L + L = E1
(g) U2 = E2 - L
U3 = E3
4.2) Generation 2 doesn't conserve
U1 = E1 - L + L = E1
(h) U2 = E2 - L + L - G = E2 - G
U3 = E3 - G
3.2) Generation 2 doesn't pay for the conservation
4.1) Generation 2 conserves what remained
U1 = E1 - L + ½L = E1 - ½L
(i) U2 = E2 - ½G - ½L
U3 = E3 - ½G14
Observation: In U 2, ½L represents the cost of conservation of the remaining
area that should be arched by the generation 2.
4.2) Generation 2 doesn't conserve
U1 = E1 - L + ½L = E1 - ½L
(j) U2 = E2 + ½L - G
U3 = E3 - G
2.3) Without global warming in t = 2 and t = 3
3.1) Generation 2 pays for the conservation
4.1) Generation 2 also conserves
U1 = E1 - L + L = E1
(e) U2 = E2 - L
U3 = E3
4.2) Generation 2 doesn't conserve
U1 = E1 - L + L = E1
(f) U2 = E2 - L + L = E2
U3 = E3
3.2) Generation 2 doesn't pay for the conservation
4.1) Generation 2 conserves what remained
U1 = E1 - L + ½L = E1 - ½L
(c) U2 = E2 - ½L
U3 = E3
4.2) Generation 2 doesn't conserve
U1 = E1 - L + ½L = E1 - ½L
(d)  U2 = E2 + ½L
U3 = E3
Resolution of the Game (to see extensive form):
1) Subgame in t4: Generation 2 makes two choices:
U(Pay - Pr) = s(E2 - L) + (1 - s) (E2 - L) = E2 - L
U(Pay - DPr) = s E2 + (1 - s) (E2 - G) = E2 - (1 - s)G
U(DPay - Pr) = s(E2 - ½L) + (1 - s) (E2 - ½G - ½L) = E2 - ½L - (1 - s)½G
U(DPay - DPr) = s(E2 + ½L) + (1 - s) (E2 + ½L - G) = E2 + ½L - (1 - s)G15
Conclusion: U(Pay - Pr)> U(DPay - Pr) if (1 - s) > ¾, reminding that (1 - s) it is
the probability of occurrence of the global warming in the period t = 3, in case it
has not happened in the period t = 2.
2) Subgame in t5: Generation 2 chooses between to pay or not to pay
U(Pay) = E2 - L
U(DPay) = E2 - ½G
Conclusion: For hypothesis, G = 2L. Therefore, Generation 2 will be indifferent
between to pay or not to pay. Also for hypothesis, it is supposed that it will pay.
3) The whole game: Generation 1 chooses between to conserve or not to
conserve
U(Pr) = E1
U(DPr) = E1 + D - (1 - p)G
Conclusion: For hypothesis, D = G. Therefore, U(P)> (ÑP), and Generation 1
will conserve.16
Figure II
Overlapping Generation Model and Global Warming
0
Pr ﬁ Conserve
DPr ﬁ Don't Conserve
Pay ﬁ Generation 2 pay for generation 1







Nature in t = 2 t0




t3 t4 Generation 2 Nature in  t=3
s  A
B (1 – s) s  A B (1 – s)
Pay DPay




2 2 t9 t10 t11
Pr Pr Pr DPr DPr DPr
(d) (f) (e) (h) (g) (j) (i)
DPr17
• Results and their Consequences
In our first model, proposed to analyse the Safe Minimum Standard (SMS)
strategy and its consequences for the CBD, it was possible to show that SMS
continues lacking a concrete theoretical justification. When modelling the
situation as a choice involving uncertainty, the conclusion is that society, even
believing that biodiversity can be necessary in the future, it prefers current
benefits of development than potential benefits derived from the maintenance of
biological diversity. This result is justified by the existence of additional costs if
someone wants to use biological diversity resources, as it was shown in Table I.
Another important result from our first model is the magnitude of the present
benefits of conservation. It was assumed that those benefits were always
smaller than the benefits of the development. Analysing our results it can be
noticed that if we alter that relation it would become much easier to guarantee
conservation. The question, then, becomes: how to increase present benefits of
conservation? Or, putting in another way: how to decrease social costs of
conservation? The solution is to turn conservation projects into self-financed
activities.
Our second model was an overlapping generation model (OLG), used with the
purpose of capturing the possibility to settle down a contract among
generations. Simulating a contract like this would help to understand how we
can motivate the current generation to conserve biological diversity aiming to
mitigate global warming effects in the future. Our central idea was to extend
Von Amsberg’s model of 1995 in order to allow a retaliation strategy by the
current generation against a future generation that does not follow  what is
established in the contract. In other words, the future generation does not want
to share costs of conservation with the present generation.
Although some of our hypotheses can be considered very restrictive, they seem
to be plausible. Solving the model, our conclusions indicate the conservation of
biological diversity is justified in a situation in which there is a high probability of
occurrence of global warming effects. is elevated (in this case if the probability
of occurrence of Global Warming in the period 2 goes larger than 50% and in
the period 3 of 75%, in case it has not happened Global Warming in the period
2). it should be observed although for the generation 2, the best choice is to
execute the agreement and also to continue preserving so that one doesn't see
harmed by the effects of Global Warming.18
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